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Abstract
Many remote user authentication schemes have been designed and developed to establish secure and authorized com-
munication between a user and server over an insecure channel. By employing a secure remote user authentication
scheme, a user and server can authenticate each other and utilize advanced services. In 2015, Cao and Ge demonstrated
that An’s scheme is also vulnerable to several attacks and does not provide user anonymity. They also proposed an
improved multi-factor biometric authentication scheme. However, we review and cryptanalyze Cao and Ge’s scheme
and demonstrate that their scheme fails in correctness and providing user anonymity and is vulnerable to ID guessing
attack and server masquerading attack. To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a security-improved authentication
scheme that provides a dynamic ID mechanism and better security functionalities. Then, we show that our proposed
scheme is secure against various attacks and prove the security of the proposed scheme using BAN Logic.
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Introduction
With the rapid development of Internet technology and
the smart device industry, users can access any service
from anywhere.1 In addition, the growth in network
technology has made these services user-friendly and
adoptable and mobile devices have become a vital part
of our lives. Nowadays, people are able to easily utilize
advanced services such as e-commerce, e-healthcare,
and e-learning.2
Despite advantages of ubiquitous mobile computing
technologies, several new threats have emerged. The
transmission of data through insecure channels leads to
the security challenges such as authentication, privacy,
and integrity. And adversaries are considered to be suf-
ficiently powerful to control communication over a
public channel. To ensure authorized and secure com-
munication, a user and server should verify their mutual
legitimacy and exchange a session key, which can be
used to transmit data securely.3,4 Moreover, an anon-
ymous authentication is required to provide secure
communications between numerous network users
while preserving privacy.
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To address security and authorized access in mobile
environments, various remote user authentication
schemes have been designed and developed. Remote
user authentication is a common approach to verify the
legitimacy of users who seek service and has become an
indispensable component of service access. By employ-
ing a remote user authentication scheme, a server first
authenticates remote users and grants service access
only to those who are legitimate and authorized while
rejecting unauthorized entities whose aim is to damage
network security.
Smart card–based authentication schemes were
introduced initially to resolve such security issues.5–7
Recently, a large amount of research on password-
based authentication schemes using smart cards has
been presented.3,8,9 However, password-based authenti-
cation schemes are vulnerable to identity/password
guessing attacks and subject to inefficient password
change policies. To resolve single-password authentica-
tion problems, several biometric-based remote user
authentication schemes have been proposed.2,10–12 In
contrast to passwords, biometric information, such as
irises, fingerprints, and palmprints, is considered to be
a unique identifier of a user and is difficult to spoof.
Therefore, biometric-based remote user authentication
is inherently more secure and reliable than conven-
tional authentication schemes.13
Li and Hwang14 proposed an efficient biometric-
based remote user authentication scheme in 2010. In
2011, Das15 cryptanalyzed and improved Li and
Hwang’s14 scheme. However, An16 found out that
Das’15 scheme failed to provide mutual authentication
and enhanced it to support secure authentication in
2012. In 2015, Cao and Ge17 demonstrated that An’s16
scheme is vulnerable to replay attacks, in which an
adversary can masquerade as the legal server. In addi-
tion, they mentioned that An’s scheme does not pro-
vide user anonymity just as most recently presented
biometric-based authentication schemes are not prop-
erly addressed, so An’s scheme is insecure against user
masquerading attack. Cao and Ge also proposed an
improved multi-factor biometric authentication scheme
to overcome the security weaknesses of An’s scheme
and support user anonymity. However, we point out
their scheme fails to provide re-registration and does
not withstand several attacks.
This article discusses the security vulnerability of
Cao and Ge’s scheme and proposes an enhanced multi-
factor biometric authentication scheme with better
security functionality than Cao and Ge’s scheme. We
provide an analysis of the security and efficiency of our
proposed scheme. The major contributions of this study
are summarized as follows:
Cryptanalysis of Cao and Ge’s scheme. We cryptanalyze
Cao and Ge’s scheme and demonstrate the
incorrectness of their scheme in re-registration phase
and the vulnerability to the off-line ID guessing attack
and server masquerading attack. We illustrate that an
adversary can obtain the identity of any legal user of
the system once he or she obtains the smart card of the
user. Hence, the scheme does not provide user
anonymity.
Enhancements of Cao and Ge’s scheme. We propose an
enhanced multi-factor biometric authentication scheme
to overcome the security weaknesses of Cao and Ge’s
scheme. Our scheme supports the dynamic identity
mechanism using timestamps and resists off-line ID
guessing attack and server masquerading attack. We
also provide password change phase to enhance the
security of the system.
Security analysis against various attacks. We analyze the
proposed scheme in security. Our scheme supports bet-
ter security functionality than that of Cao and Ge’s
scheme. Our scheme is secure against off-line ID gues-
sing attack, user masquerading attack, and server mas-
querading attack. In addition, it provides user
anonymity, mutual authentication, session key agree-
ment, efficient password change, and forward secrecy.
We also prove that our scheme provides mutual
authentication using Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN)
Logic.18
Preliminaries
In this section, we present notations and then define
Bio-Hashing.
Notations
The notations used throughout this article are described
in Table 1.
Bio-hashing
Biometric technology often attracts attention in the
area of unique user authentication in general authenti-
cation systems. Especially, the use of biometric infor-
mation is extending steadily in cryptosystem for
authentication purpose. However, imprint biometric
characteristics (such as fingerprint, palmprint, retina,
and iris) may not appear exactly the same in each scan.
With high probability, imprinted biometric information
rejects registered, legitimate users. To resolve the high
false rejection rate, Jin et al.19 proposed a two-factor
authenticator on iterated inner products comprising a
tokenized pseudo-random number and user-specific fin-
gerprint features, which produces a set of user-specific
compact codes; this is called Bio-Hashing. Later,
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Lumini and Nanni20 proposed an improvement of Bio-
Hashing. As noted by Chang et al.,21 Bio-Hashing is
used to map a user’s/patient’s biometric feature onto
user-specific random vectors to generate a code called a
bio-code and then discretize the projection coefficients
into zeroes and ones. Bio-Hashing is verified to be the
most suitable and compatible technique that can be uti-
lized in tiny smart devices such as smart cards and
smart phones.22
Review of Cao and Ge’s authentication
scheme
In this section, we review Cao and Ge’s authentication
scheme. It comprises four phases: registration phase,
re-registration phase, login phase, and authentication
phase.
Registration phase
A user Ci first registers oneself at a trusted registration
center Ri to obtain the service from the remote server Si
and receives a personalized smart card. A user chooses
one’s identity IDi and password PWi, imprints biometric
information Bi, and then performs the following steps:
(R1) A user Ci chooses random number K and
then compute (PWi  K) and (Bi  K).
Then, Ci submits (IDi,PWi  K,Bi  K) to
Ri via a secure channel.
(R2) Ri computes fi= h(Bi  K), ri= h(PWi  K)
 fi, ei= h(IDijjXS) ri.
(R3) Ri creates an entry in the account database
for the user IDi and store ni= 0 in this
entry. Then, Ri computes EIDi= h(IDi)jjni.
(R4) Ri computes vi= h(h(PWi)jjh(Bi)jjXS).
(R5) Ri sends a smart card that contains
fEIDi, h(), fi, ei, nig to Ci via a secure chan-
nel. Then, Ci stores a random K in the
smart card.
Re-registration phase
(RR1) Ci chooses a new random number K
0
and
then submits to Ri the identity IDi, password
information (PWi  K 0 ), and biometric
information (Bi  K 0 ) via a secure channel.
(RR2) Ri computes v
0
i= h(h(PWi)jjh(Bi)jjXS) and
compares it with vi in the account database.
(RR3) If v
0
i is equal to vi, Ri sets ninew = ni+1.
Then, Ri performs the following computa-
tions; finew = h(Bi  K
0
), rinew = h(PWi  K
0
)
finew , einew = h(IDijjXS) rinew . And then EIDi
is updated as EIDi= h(IDi)jjninew .
(RR4) Ri sends a new smart card that contains the
information fEIDi, h(), finew , einew , ninewg to Ci
via a secure channel. Then, Ci stores the
random number K
0
in the smart card.
Login phase
In order to login to the remote server Si, the user Ci per-
forms the following steps using the smart card:
(L1) Ci imprints one’s biometric information Bi,
then the smart card SCi computes h(Bi  K)
and compares it with fi. If it is valid, SCi
continues the following steps.
(L2) Ci chooses a random number RC and inputs
(IDi,PWi,RC) into the smart card. Then,
SCi computes ri= h(PWi  K) fi
h(H(Bi),M1= ei  ri,M2=M1  RC, M3=
h(M1jjRc).
(L3) SCi computes EIDi= h(IDi)jjni.
(L4) Ci sends the login request message
fEIDi,M2,M3g to Si.
Authentication phase
The user Ci and the remote server Si verify the authenti-
city of each other in this phase as follows:
(A1) Si checks the validity of the received EIDi
by comparing h(IDi)jjni in the account
database.
(A2) If it is valid, Si computes M4= h(IDijjXS)
and M5=M2 M4.
Table 1. Notations.
Notation Meaning
Ci User i
Ri Trusted registration center i
Si Remote server i
IDi Actual identity of Ci
VIDi Virtual identity of Ci
DIDi Dynamic identity of Ci
PWi Password of Ci
Bi Biometric template of Ci
SCi Smart card of user Ci
Ai Adversary i
XS Secret key of Si
x Master key of Ri
K Random number for registration of Ci
RC Random number generated by Ci
RS Random number generated by Si
jj Concatenate operation
 Bitwise XOR operation
h() Secure hash function
H() Bio-Hashing function
yi A unique number of Ci generated by the Ri
Ti Timestamp
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(A3) If M3= h(M4jjM5), Si chooses a random
number RS and computes M6=M4
RS ,M7= h(M4jjRS).
(A4) Then, Si sends the message fEIDi,M6,M7g
to Ci.
(A5) Ci computes M8=M6 M1 and checks
whether M7= h(M1jjM8) or not. If it is
valid, Ci computes M9= h(M1jjRCjjM8).
(A6) Ci sends the message fM9g to Si.
(A7) Si computes M10= h(M4jjM5jjRS). If M10
=M9, Si accepts the user’s login request
and sends the message fM10g to Ci.
(A8) Ci checks whether M10= h(M1jjRCjjM8) or
not. If it is valid, Ci accepts Si as the legiti-
mate server.
Cryptanalysis of Cao and Ge’s
authentication scheme
In this section, we analyze the security problems of
Cao and Ge’s scheme. Cao and Ge17 cryptanalyzed
Younghwa An’s16 scheme and improved it to support
better security functionality. However, we found out
that Cao and Ge’s remote user authentication scheme
has security vulnerabilities. We assume that the cap-
abilities of adversaries are as follows:2,23
 An adversary Ai has total control over the com-
munication channel connecting the users and the
remote server in login/authentication phase.
Thus, the adversary can intercept, insert, delete,
or modify any message transmitted via a public
channel.
 An adversary may either steal a user’s smart card
or obtain a user’s password, but not both.
 An adversary can extract the information stored
in a smart card by means of analyzing the power
consumption of the smart card.
Incorrectness in registration phase
Younghwa An16 claimed that if the password PWi and
biometric information Bi of the user are revealed to the
server, the insider in the server can obtain the user’s
password and biometric information directly. To pro-
tect the user’s information from the insider in the ser-
ver, Younghwa An concealed password and biometric
information in registration phase using a XOR ()
operation with user’s information. Thus, the insider of
the server may not know the user’s password and bio-
metric information. Cao and Ge referred to this method
too; however, they failed to provide correctness. We
show that registration phase of Cao and Ge’s17 scheme
fails in correctness:
1. The user Ci submits (IDi,PWi  K,Bi  K) to
the server Ri via a secure channel.
2. Ri computes vi= h(h(PWi)jjh(Bi)jjXS).
3. From the received message (IDi,PWi  K,
Bi  K), Ri cannot extract PWi and Bi. Ri cannot
compute vi too because it is computationally
impossible to derive h(PWi) and h(Bi).
We showed that Cao and Ge’s scheme has fails in
correctness and ultimately cannot proceed with re-
registration phase because vi is used to check the valid-
ity of the user in re-registration phase, but Ri cannot
compute vi. This means that it is vulnerable to user
masquerading attack as is An’s scheme. Therefore, the
method of generation of vi or the way to update user’s
identity must be revised.
Off-line identity guessing attack
The identity of a user is registered at the registration
center. Users normally choose their social security ID,
e-mail, phone number, and so on as their identity and
are requested to input their identity, password, and bio-
metric information in login phase. Although users
attempt to keep their identities secret, identities are
selected from a limited set that can be enumerated, and
adversaries have sufficient power to guess from a lim-
ited set of identities in the off-line condition.24 The
complexity of this attack depends on the length of the
identity. We show that Cao and Ge’s scheme is vulner-
able to off-line identity guessing attack.
1. An adversary Ai can know the information of
the user Ci stored in a smart card. Ai extracts ni
from the smart card.
2. When Ci sends the login message to the remote
server Si, Ai records EIDi.
3. Ai selects a candidate identity ID
0
i, then computes
EID
0
i= h(ID
0
i)jjni. Ai compares the computed
EID
0
i with the recorded EIDi. If they are equal,
the adversary guesses the identity of the user Ci
correctly. Otherwise, the adversary selects
another candidate identity and repeats this step.
Once the identity of the user is revealed, an adver-
sary can recognize and trace the user before the user
performs re-registration phase. However, as we men-
tioned in ‘‘Incorrectness in registration phase,’’ Cao
and Ge’s scheme fails in correctness to proceed re-
registration phase. Therefore, the adversary can iden-
tify and trace the user continuously.
Server masquerading attack
Cao and Ge analyzed the security of their authentica-
tion scheme against server masquerading attack by
sending M10, because Ci will finally find that the
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equation M10 is not equal to M9. However, Ci cannot
know whether the sender of the message
fEIDi,M6,M7g is valid or not. Thus, the message M9,
Ci sends to the server, can be sent to the adversary
attempting to masquerade as the legal server. Finally,
the adversary who sends the fEIDi,M6,M7g can obtain
the message M9 and send a valid message M10 by repla-
cing it with the message M9 received right before the
communication. We show that Cao and Ge’s scheme is
vulnerable to server masquerading attack:
1. An adversary Ai can intercept the message
fEIDi,M6,M7g over the communication channel.
2. When a new session is opened, Ai sends the
replaying message fEIDi,M6,M7g to Ci during
the authentication phase pretending to the legal
server.
3. Ci sends the message M9 to the adversary because
he or she still don’t know whether the server is
valid or not using the message fEIDi,M6,M7g.
4. Ai responds with the message M10 which is the
received message M9 from Ci.
5. Ci checks whether M10 is equal to M9 or not.
Because M9=M10, Ci regards the adversary as
the legal server.
An adversary can masquerade as the server before
the user performs re-registration phase. However, as we
mentioned in ‘‘Incorrectness in registration phase,’’ Cao
and Ge’s scheme fails in correctness to proceed with re-
registration phase. Therefore, the adversary can con-
tinue pretending to be the legal server.
The proposed remote user authentication
scheme
We propose a dynamic ID-based multi-factor biometric
authentication scheme to overcome the security prob-
lems of Cao and Ge’s remote user authentication
scheme. In the proposed scheme, we use timestamps to
support the dynamic identity mechanism and resist off-
line ID guessing attack. We assume that the registra-
tion center and the remote server are trustworthy and
share a server’s secret key XS and a master key of the
registration center x in advance. Our scheme comprises
four phases: registration phase, login phase, authentica-
tion phase, and password change phase.
Registration phase
In this phase, a user Ci chooses one’s identity IDi and
password PWi, and imprints biometric information Bi,
then performs following steps:
(R1) A user Ci chooses a random number K, and
then computes (PWi  K) and (H(Bi) K).
Then, Ci submits (IDi,PWi  K,H(Bi) K)
to Ri via a secure channel.
(R2) Ri chooses an unique number yi of Ci and
computes fi= h(H(Bi) K), ri= h(PWi
K) fi, ei= h(IDijjXS) ri,VIDi= h(yijjXS)
 IDi  h(PWi  Kjjh(H(Bi) K)), Zi= yi
h(x), and Gi= h(h(IDijj XS)).
(R3) Ri creates an entry in the IDi and virtual
identity VIDi in this entry.
(R4) Ri stores fVIDi, h(),H(), fi, ei, Zi,Gig into the
smart card SCi delivers it to Ci via a secure
channel.
(R5) Upon receiving SCi, Ci stores a random K in
the smart card.
Figure 1 illustrates the registration phase of the pro-
posed remote user authentication scheme.
Login phase
In order to login to the remote server Si, the user Ci per-
forms following steps using the smart card as follows:
(L1) Ci imprints one’s biometric information Bi
and computes H(Bi), then SCi computes
h(H(Bi) K) and compares it with fi. If it is
valid, SCi continues the following steps.
(L2) Ci chooses a random number RC and inputs
(IDi,PWi,RC) into the smart card. Then,
SCi computes r
0
i= h(PWi  K) fi,M1=
ei  r0i,M2= M1  RC,M3= h(M1jjRCjjT1).
To generate dynamic identity DIDi, Ci com-
putes DIDi=VIDi  h(h(yijjXS)jjT1), where
h(yijjXS)=VIDi  IDi  h(PWi  Kjjh(H(Bi)
K)).
(L3) Ci sends the login request message
fDIDi, Zi,M2,M3, T1g to Si.
Authentication phase
The user Ci and the remote server Si verify the authenti-
city of each other and generate a session key in this
phase as follows.
(A1) Upon receiving fDIDi, Zi,M2,M3, T1g, Si
verifies T1  T DT . If the verification is
failed, Si stops the session. Otherwise, Si
checks the validity of the received DIDi by
comparing VID
0
i=VIDi in the account data-
base, where VID
0
i=DIDi  h(h(yijjXS)jjT1),
yi= Zi h(x).
(A2) If the verification is failed, Si stops the ses-
sion. Otherwise, Si computes M4=
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h(IDijjXS), M5=M2 M4 and checks
whether M3= h(M4jjM5jjT1) or not.
(A3) If the verification is failed, Si stops the ses-
sion. Otherwise, Si chooses a random num-
ber RS and computes M6=M4  RS ,
M7= h(M4jjRS jjT2). And then, Si sends the
message fM6,M7, T2g to Ci.
(A4) Ci verifies T2  T DT . If the verification is
failed, Ci stops the session. Otherwise, Ci
computes M8=M1 M6, and then checks
whether M7= h(M1jjM8jjT2).
(A5) If the verification is failed, Ci stops the ses-
sion. Otherwise, Ci computes M9= h(M1jj
RCjjM8jjT2) and sends the message fM9, T3g
to Si. And then Ci computes a session key
SK= h(RCjjM8jjT2jjT3jjM9).
(A6) Si verifies T3  T DT . If the verification is
failed, Si stops the session. Otherwise, Si
checks whether M9= h(M4jjM5jjRS jjT2) or
not. If the verification is failed, Si stops the
session. Otherwise, Si computes a session
key SK
0
= h(M5jjRS jjT2jjT3jjM9) and sends
h(SK
0
) to Ci.
(A7) Ci checks the validity of h(SK
0
) by compar-
ing h(SK). If the verification succeeds,
Ci authenticates Si. On the success of
authentication, Ci and Si have a common
session SK.
Figure 2 illustrates our proposed remote user
authentication scheme.
Password change phase
The smart card establishes an authorized session with
the user Ci to verify the correctness of input parameters
(identity, password, and biometric information). Ci
updates the password without interaction with the
remote server or the registration center:
(P1) Ci inserts the smart card SCi into the card
reader. Then, Ci inputs IDi,PWi and a new
password PWnewi , and then imprints Bi.
(P2) SCi computes f
0
i = h(H(Bi) K) and then
verifies biometric information by compar-
ing f
0
i = fi. If the verification is failed, the
session is terminated. Otherwise, SCi com-
putes r
0
i= h(PWi  K) f
0
i , then checks the
validity of IDi and PWi by comparing
Gi= h(h(ei  r0i)).
(P3) If the verification is failed, the session is ter-
minated. Otherwise, SCi computes r
new
i =
h(PWnewi  K) f
0
i , e
new
i = ei  r
0
i  rnewi .
Then, SCi stores e
new
i in place of ei.
Figure 3 illustrates password change of the proposed
remote user authentication scheme.
Analysis
In this section, we describe an analysis of our proposed
authentication scheme with respect to security and per-
formance. We assume that the capabilities of adver-
saries are the same as those from our cryptanalysis of
Cao and Ge’s authentication scheme. We first prove the
security of our proposed scheme using BAN Logic.18
Then, we show the security analysis of proposed scheme
against various attacks.
Authentication proof based on BAN logic
In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed
authentication scheme with BAN Logic18 which is a
formal analysis method for authentication protocols.
Table 2 illustrates notations used in BAN Logic.
1. The BAN Logic postulates
a. Message meaning rule concerns the inter-
pretation of messages. They all derive
beliefs about the origin of messages.
Figure 1. Registration phase.
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Figure 2. Proposed remote user authentication scheme.
Figure 3. Password update phase.
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For shared keys, we postulate
P believes Q$K P,P sees fXgK
P believes Q said X
That is, if P believes that the key K is shared with Q
and sees X encrypted under K, then P believes that
Q once said X .
b. Nonce-verification rule expresses the check
that a message is recent, and hence, that
the sender still believes in it
P believes fresh (X ) , P believes Q said X
P believes Q believes X
That is, if P believes that X could have been uttered
only recently and that Q once said X , then P believes
that Q believes X .
c. Jurisdiction rule states that if P believes that
Q has jurisdiction over X , then P trusts Q on
the truth of X
P believes Q controls X , P believes Q believes X
P believes X
d. If a principal sees a formula, then he also
sees its components, provided he knows the
necessary keys
P sees (X , Y )
P sees X
,
Psees hX iY
P sees X
Pbelieves Q$K P (, )P sees ½X K
P sees X
P believes 7!K P , P sees ½X K
P sees X
P believes 7!K P , P sees ½X K1
P sees X
Note that if P sees X and P sees Y , it does NOT fol-
low that P sees (X , Y ) since that means that X and Y
were uttered at the same time.
e. Freshness-conjuncatenation rule states that if
one part of the formula is fresh, then the
entire formula must be fresh
P believes fresh(X )
P believes fresh(X , Y )
2. Security goals. The proposed scheme will satisfy
the following goals
g1: Cij[Ci$SK Si
g2: Sij[Ci$SK Si
g3: Cij[Sij[Ci$SK Si
g4: Sij[Cij[Ci$SK Si
3. Idealized scheme. We transform our scheme into
the idealized form as follows
Msg1: Ci ! Si :\VIDi.h(yijjXS ),
(RC)h(IDijjXS ),\Yi.h(x)
Msg2: Si ! Ci : (RS)h(IDijjXS )
Msg3: Ci ! Si : (RC,RS)h(IDijjXS )
Msg4: Si ! Ci : (RC,RS ,Ci$SK Si)h(IDijjXS )
4. Initiative premises. We make the assumptions
about the initial state of the scheme to analyze
the proposed scheme as follows
p1: Cij[Ci  !h((yijjXS )) Si
p2: Sij[Ci  !h((yijjXS )) Si
p3: Cij[Ci  !h((IDijjXS )) Si
p4: Sij[Ci  !h((IDijjXS )) Si
Table 2. BAN logic notations.
Notations Meaning
Pj[X P believes X
P / X P sees X
Pj;X P once said X
P) X P has jurisdiction over X
#(X) X is fresh
P$K Q P and Q may use the shared key K
P›X Q X is a secret known only to P and to Q
hXiY X combined with the formula Y
(X)K X hashed under the key K
fXgK X encrypted under the key K
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p5: Cij[Sij[Ci  !h((IDijjXS )) Si
p6: Sij[Cij[Ci  !h((IDijjXS )) Si
p7: Cij[#(RS)
p8: Sij[#(RC)
p9: Cij[Si ) Ci$SK Si
p10: Sij[Ci ) Ci$SK Si
p11: Cij[Si$h(x)RC
5. Security analysis of the idealized form of the
proposed scheme
a1. According to Msg1, We could get
Si /\VIDi.h(yijjXS ), (RC)h(IDijjXS ),\yi.h(x)
a2. According to p2 and p4, we apply the
message-meaning rule to obtain
Sij[Cij;\VIDi.h(yijjXS ), (RC)h(IDijjXS )
a3. According to p8, we apply the freshness-
conjuncatenation rule to obtain
Sij[#(\VIDi.h(yijjXS ), (RC)h(IDijjXS ))
Then, we apply the nonce-verification rule to obtain
Sij[Cij[\VIDi.h(yijjXS ), (RC)h(IDijjXS )
a4. According to Msg3, we could get
Si / (RC,RS)h(IDijjXS )
a5. According to p4, we apply the message-
meaning rule to obtain
Sij[Cij;(RC,RS)h(IDijjXS )
a6. According to p8, we apply the freshness-
conjuncatenation rule to obtain
Sij[#(RC,RS)h(IDijjXS )
Then, we apply the nonce-verification rule to obtain
Sij[Cij[(RC,RS)h(IDijjXS )
a7. According to a6 and p6 and
SK= h(RC,RS , h(IDijjXS)), we could
obtain
Sij[Cij[Ci$SK Si (Goals 4)
a8. According to a7 and p9, we apply the juris-
diction rule to obtain
Sij[Ci$SK Si (Goals 2)
a9. According to Msg4, we could get
Ci / (RC,RS ,Ci$SK Si)h(IDijjXS )
a10. According to p3, we apply the message-
meaning rule to obtain
Cij[Sij;(RC,RS ,Ci$SK Si)h(IDijjXS )
a11. According to p7, we apply the freshness-
conjuncatenation rule to obtain
Cij[#(RC,RS ,Ci$SK Si)h(IDijjXS )
Then, we apply the nonce-verification rule to obtain
Cij[Sij[(RC,RS ,Ci$SK Si)h(IDijjXS )
a12. According to a11, we apply the BAN Logic
rule to break conjunctions to produce
Cij[Sij[Ci$SK Si (Goals 3)
a13. According to a12 and p9, we apply the juris-
diction rule to produce
Cij[Ci$SK Si (Goals1)
According to (Goal 1), (Goal 2), (Goal 3), and (Goal
4), we know that Ci and Si believe SK is shared.
Security analysis against various attacks
Off-line ID guessing attack. The smart card and login mes-
sage contain pseudo identities, VIDi and DIDi, which
are random values. Suppose an adversary Ai obtains
these values and the smart card SCi. To derive an actual
identity IDi from VIDi, the adversary is required to
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guess both h(yijjXS) and IDi concurrently. The probabil-
ity of guessing them correctly, when IDi is composed of
n characters and the hash value is taken as 160 bits, is
approximately 1=26n+160 and it is considered to be a
computationally infeasible problem.21,25 The complex-
ity of our proposed scheme against this attack is higher
than that of Cao and Ge’s scheme. To derive IDi from
DIDi, Ai is required to compute more, which means that
the complexity is higher, because DIDi is dynamic.
User masquerading attack. Ai is required to compute a
valid login request to impersonate a legal user. Ai may
attempt to login to Si using the message
fDIDi, Zi,M2,M3, T1g. However, DIDi is dynamic in
every session, so Ai cannot use the message repeatedly.
Moreover, Ai cannot generate a valid dynamic identity
either because he or she cannot know h(yijjXS).
Server masquerading attack. To masquerade as a legal
server, Ai must compute messages fM6,M7g and h(SK).
An’s16 scheme and Cao and Ge’s17 scheme were vulner-
able to this attack because Ai could replay messages
captured in a previous session. However, our proposed
scheme is secure against this attack because we use
timestamps, and the messages are fresh in each session.
User anonymity. We use pseudo identities to hide an
actual identity. To derive IDi from VIDi or DIDi, Ai
should know h(yijjXS); however, it is computationally
infeasible to correctly guess yi and XS concurrently.
Therefore, it is difficult for Ai to derive IDi from pseudo
identities.
Mutual authentication. The server verifies the legitimate
user by checking the equivalence M9=
h(M4jjM5jjRS jjT2). Likewise, the user ensures the valid-
ity of the server by checking the equivalence
h(SK
0
)= h(SK). However, Ai can masquerade as neither
the legitimate user nor the server. Therefore, the pro-
posed scheme provides proper mutual authentication.
Forward secrecy. Suppose that the server’s secret key XS
is compromised, the identity IDi is still unknown to Ai.
Therefore, h(IDijjXS) is kept secret and RC and RS
remain secure. Thus, compromise of XS does not allow
Ai to compute the previous session keys.
We compare the functionality features and the com-
putational cost of the proposed scheme with those of
other existing schemes. Table 3 compares the function-
ality features provided by our scheme with those of
other existing schemes. s denotes the scheme provides
the property; 3 denotes the scheme does not provide
the property; NA denotes the scheme does not consider
the property.
Performance
In Table 4, we compare the computational cost. Th
denotes the computation time for hash function; TH
denotes the computation time for Bio-Hashing
Table 3. Comparisons of the functionality features.
Das’s scheme15 Younghwa An’s scheme16 Cao and Ge’s scheme17 Proposed scheme
Resists ID guessing attack NA NA 3 s
Resists user masquerading attack 3 3 s s
Resists server masquerading attack 3 3 3 s
and replay attack
Provides user anonymity 3 3 3 s
Provides mutual authentication 3 3 3 s
Provides session key agreement 3 3 3 s
Provides efficient password change 3 3 3 s
Provides forward secrecy NA NA NA s
Table 4. Comparisons of the computation costs.
Das’s scheme15 Younghwa An’s scheme16 Cao and Ge’s scheme17 Proposed scheme
User RC Server User RC Server User RC Server User RC Server
Registration 0 3Th 0 0 3Th 0 0 7Th 0 TH 6Th 0
Login 2Th 0 0 3Th 0 0 4Th 0 0 1TH + 5Th 0 0
Authentication 3Th 3Th 5Th 2Th 0 4Th 3Th 0 4Th 4Th 0 8Th
Total 5Th 3Th 5Th 5Th 3Th 4Th 7Th 7Th 4Th 2TH + 9Th 6Th 8Th
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function. XOR operations are not considered because
it can be ignored comparing with Th. Our scheme is
constructed on one-way hash functions and XOR oper-
ations. The computation cost of ours is similar to An16
and Cao and Ge,17 but the proposed scheme provides
the enhanced security functionalities and is secure
against various attacks.
Conclusion
Users are able to access and utilize advanced services
owing to the growth of Internet technology and smart
devices. However, given the unsolved security problems
and adversaries that are sufficiently powerful to control
communication, users are exposed to malicious attacks,
and extension of Internet service is limited. To ensure
authorized and secure communication, a user and ser-
ver should verify each other’s legitimacy.
In this article, we demonstrated the security vulner-
ability of Cao and Ge’s scheme and its incorrectness in
re-registration phase. We noted that their scheme is
vulnerable to off-line ID guessing attack and server
masquerading attack and fails in correctness. In addi-
tion, we proposed an enhanced multi-factor biometric
authentication scheme with better security functionality
than that of Cao and Ge. Our scheme supports a
dynamic identity mechanism using timestamps and
resists off-line ID guessing attack and server masquer-
ading attack. Our scheme satisfies all desirable security
attributes, as demonstrated in the security analysis.
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